Novel Beings: Moral Status and Regulation

A special section of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Volume 30, Issue 3, July 2021.

Tigard, Daniel W. 

Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible.

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Champagne, Marc

Commentary: The Mandatory Ontology of Robot Responsibility.

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Tigard, Daniel W. 

 Response to Champagne: Artificial Agents in Natural Moral Communities: A Brief Clarification.

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Shevlin, Henry 

How Could We Know When A Robot Was A Moral Patient?

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Danaher, John

What Matters for Moral Status: Behavioral or Cognitive Equivalence?

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McKeown, Alex 

What Do We Owe to Novel Synthetic Beings and How Can We Be Sure?

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Arnason, Gardar

The Moral Status of Cognitively Enhanced Monkeys and Other Novel Beings.

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Jowitt, Joshua 

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings.

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Mowbray, Miranda

Moral Status for Malware! The Difficulty of Defining Advanced Artificial Intelligence.

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McMahon, Aisling

Patents and Control: Ethics and the Patentability of Novel Beings and Advanced Biotechnologies in Europe.

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Black, Isra

Novel Beings and Assisted Nonexistence.

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